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Abstract     JEL # J2
The  distribution of individual job tenure is a revealing measure of job stability. We consider
differences  in individual job tenure between Australia and Britain. We employ linked data for
individual  employee and workplace characteristics. This enables us to distinguish between the
effects  of demographic, education, job characteristics, occupation and work environment for the
individual, as well as of the workplace in which they work. Whilst, the various individual
characteristics  are, as a group, found to be essentially uncorrelated with the workplace effect, this
is not true for  women and non-white employees. We find that the lower tenure rates associated
with  membership of these groups is predominantly captured by workplace effects suggesting some
degree of labour market segmentation, especially so  in Britain. We also find union membership
to be strongly related to longer tenure in both countries, supporting  the union-voice literature.
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1.  Introduction  
The  issue of the stability of jobs has increasingly become a question of public and professional
interest  over the last two decades. A recent focus of this interest has been on the possible changes
in  the distribution of worker’s tenure. In particular, authors have examined the question of
whether  jobs are less long lasting than they used to be. Whilst the results from these papers are
far from uniform, they  do suggest that in the US there has been some decrease in tenure (albeit
modest)  amongst those white males who had previously had relatively long tenure, amongst
blacks  and amongst young adults (Neumark  et al,  1999). Similarly,  the UK has seen some fall
in  the average male tenure (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995), especially so amongst the lower paid
(Burgess  and Rees, 1996), although again these changes are not dramatic (Nickell, 1999). None
of  these papers, however, consider the cross-sectional distribution of tenure and it’s
determination. This is the focus of our paper.
Tenure  is one of a number of measures of job stability. We could alternatively identify quit
rates  or total separations
1.  An advantage of tenure as a measure of stability is that it captures
longer  run, more permanent behaviour. A drawback, as Freeman (1980) notes, is that the job-
related  information we have from survey data relates primarily to current job conditions rather
than  to earlier periods of the relationship between worker and firm. This may especially affect the
interpretation of the influence of attitudinal questions.
Much  of the existing literature on job tenure has concentrated on the extent to which the
presence  of trade unions increases individual job tenure by providing a ‘voice’ for grievances as
well  as increased wages, both resulting in lower quit rates. The analysis in this literature, initiated
by  Freeman (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1984) was restricted by the nature of the available
datasets which  provided little demographic and job-related information in addition to measures
of  individual tenure. In particular, none of the existing studies employ any substantive workplace
information.  In contrast, our paper employs datasets which are built on linked employee-
workplace survey information.
In this  paper we compare and explore the determinants of the distribution of job tenure
amongst  employees in both Britain and Australia. In so doing, we will consider differences in the3
nature  of the workplaces; the characteristics of the  employees; and (to a limited extent) the nature
of  the regulatory systems across the two countries. This study is possible due to recently produced
linked  surveys of  workplaces and their employees in the two countries (the Australian Workplace
Industrial  Relations Survey 1995, AWIRS95, and the British  Workplace Employee Relations
Survey  1998, WERS98). Whilst such a detailed study of tenure has not been carried out for these
countri es before, our paper follows a small but nevertheless important literature of previous
comparisons  and contrasts between the two countries’ economic and industrial relations systems.
A more complete explanation of the distribution of individual and workplace tenure
conta ins both labour supply and demand elements. Thus, the inclusion of workplace effects in
addition  to the labour supply determinants that feature in the work following Freeman (1980) may
play  an important role. We will explicitly consider the role of changes in workplace labour demand
on  job tenure by incorporating features of the Cabellero and Hammour (1994) model of job
reallocation  into our analysis at the workplace level. There is an obvious link between higher job
reallocation  rates and lower average tenure in a workplace since anything which increases new
hires  will decrease average tenure  ceteris paribus as will anything which increases separations.
Mumford  and Smith (2000) explored this relationship more fully by considering job reallocation
and  average tenure as alternative dependent variables for Australia. They found that, with the
exclusion  of training,  variables which were found to have a significant effect on job reallocation
had a significant and opposite effect on average tenure.
In  this study, we propose to extend these earlier papers by concentrating on the
determination  of individual worker tenure given knowledge of the average tenure and
characteristics  of the workplace where they are employed. In particular, we are interested in
discovering  if low tenure individuals are concentrated in workplaces which have low average
tenure  (and  vice  versa)  and if this is true in both Australia and Britain. In so doing, we will
explicitly  consider the industrial relations practices within workplaces and the implications of these
practices  on tenure rates. We also want to know whether there are identifiable characteristics of
individual  employees which makes them more likely to have shorter tenure than their workplace
average  (and  vice versa). We find that individual and workplace effects explain, on the  margin,
about  equal amounts of the variation of individual tenure in both Britain and Australia. This result
emphasises  the importance of allowing for workplace effects. Furthermore, the two sets of
variables are essentially uncorrelated with one another.4
An  important related issue is that of labour market segmentation. For example, it is
possible  that the labour market is in some ways divided into workplaces which offer better
working  conditions, are more attractive places of employment and are associated with longer
tenure,  and those that are not (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, and Taubman and Wachter, 1986). It
has previously been shown  that females and non-white employees have shorter tenure (Burgess
1998, and Neumark  et al,  1999). Here we show that in our datasets this result is predominantly
due  to the nature of the workplace they are employed in. Important differences between Australia
and  Britain are clear here too. We find that the apparent segmentation of females and non-whites
into workplaces characterised by shorter tenure is significantly stronger in Britain  than in
Australia.  Indeed, in Britain the shorter individual tenure effects of females and non-whites
disappear once workplace effects are allowed for.
In  section 2 of the paper we examine and contrast the industrial relations environment in
Britain  and Australia. Having described the data sets in section 3, we go on to discuss the
determination  on individual and workplace tenure job tenure in section 4. Section 5 discusses
econometric issues whilst section 6 evaluates the estimation results. We conclude in section 7.
2.  The industrial relations environment in Britain and Australia. 
Australia has a highly legalised and central  system of industrial relations (including compulsory
third  party arbitration) which has been in place since the Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904.
This  Act encouraged the growth of large national based unions; agreements between the parties
are  ratified by the court as awards and are fully legal documents; and collective agreements have
historically  been fully facilitated by the system. In contrast, since the Trade Disputes Act of 1906,
Britain  has encouraged a non-legalistic industrial relations environment: parties could not claim
damages  resulted from disputes; agreements were rarely formalised in written contracts; there is
not  sweeping compulsory arbitration; and collective agreements have reflected union and
management  strategy rather than the structure of the system itself (Whitfield  et al,  1994). Whilst
both  countries have seen recent changes in their political environments which have resulted in less
collective  action in Australia and greater legalism in Britain (Miller and Mulvey, 1991 and
Whitfield  et al 1994), the two systems are nevertheless poles apart.
Early empirical comparisons of the  relative impact of the differing regulatory systems in
Australia  and Britain typically involved macro comparisons across countries and/or time. These5
studies  generated contradictory results depending on the labour market outcome being
investigated. For example,   Norris (1980) concluded that the Australian system does not affect
the  wage structure because the latter was found to be similar to the British wage structure,
whereas  Kuhn (1966), Iremonger  et al (1973) and Mumford (1993) found that the regulatory
system  does impact on strike behaviour since Australian strikes are more frequent but are of
shorter  duration. These studies are inherently subject to criticism of their imprecision, however,
predominantly due to aggregation and lack of control variables. 
A  more recent study comparing the impact of the industrial relations  regulatory system
on  labour market outcomes in Britain and Australia avoided many of these difficulties by using
cross  section surveys of  workplaces (but not employees) which were carried out in the two
countries  prior to those surveys examined in this paper. Whitfield  et al (1994) found that the
respective  regulatory regimes led to differences in the levels of  industrial action and the presence
of  a specialist manager consistent with their hypotheses. They also found significant dissimilarities
in  the behaviour of union density and voluntary labour turnover in the two countries, although
the  relationship between these variables and the regulatory system was not as they predicted. In
particular,  the measure of voluntary labour turnover  in Australia was much higher than they
expected.
There  have been a series of studies of total labour turnover using the same, earlier,
workplace industrial relations surveys  which have documented the nature of job reallocation in
Britain (Konings, 1995), in Australia (Mumford and Smith, 1996 and 2000) and  comparing the
two  (Blanchflower and Burgess, 1998). It has been consistently found that the rate of job
reallocation  is greater in Australia than in Britain (OECD, 1994). Typically these studies have
found  that for both countries there are lower job reallocation rates in those workplaces which are
older,  larger, offering higher wages, facing greater competition in the product market, more
labour  intensive or using older technology. However, these studies made little of the different
industrial  relations regimes in the two countries nor did they explicitly consider tenure or
dissimilarities in the individual characteristics of employees.  
There have also been studies exploring average tenure as a  measure of labour turnover,
although  these are surprisingly few for Britain and nonexistent for Australia (Burgess, 1998).
Furthermore,  none of these studies have used the workplace industrial relations surveys: most of6
2Department  of Trade and Industry  (1999). Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 1998 (computer
file). 4
th  ed. Colchester: The Data Archive (distributor), 22 December 1999. SN: 3955. 
them are more aggregated and employ  a severely limited array of explanatory variables leaving
them  open to aggregation bias, low fit and an inability to distinguish between important
determinants  of the distribution of tenure (Bromars and Famulari, 1997, and Bingley and
Westergaad-Nielsen, 1998). 
3.  Data.
The  data used in this study are drawn from the Australian WorkPlace Relations Survey 1995
(AWIRS95)  and the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98)
2.  The
Australian  survey was based on the British predecessor to WERS98 (the WIRS series, discussed
below)  so that AWIRS95 and WER98 have  many overlapping questions and a very similar
surveying  approach. The extension AWIRS95 made (in common with WERS98) was to include
a  linked survey of employees. The two new surveys collect an extensive range of information on
both  employees and their workplaces, covering standard economic and industrial relations issues
raised above. 
AWIRS95  is the second in a series of large-scale surveys of workplaces in Australia (the
first  survey, AWIRS90, was carried out in 1990). Both AWIRS surveys were undertaken by what
is  now the Australian Commonwealth Department of Industrial Relations. Our study will
concentrate on AWIRS95. Surveying for AWIRS95 was conducted  between August 1995 and
January  1996 (Morehead   et al,  1997). The respondents were from 2001 workplaces which
employed  20 or more employees. From each of these workplaces, the general manager, employee
relations  manager and trade union delegate (from the union with most members at the workplace)
were  asked to complete separate face-to-face surveys. The results from each of these three
surveys  are fully linkable. Furthermore, individual employees from these workplaces were also
surveyed  for a vast range of information including their personal characteristics, individual job
characteristics,  work environment, etc. This survey of individuals  included  19,155 employees
and is also fully linkable to the main surveys.7
3‘The senior lay representative of the  recognised union with the most members at the workplace or if there were
no  recognised unions, but a joint consultative committee operated, the senior employee representative on that
committee’ (Cully, 1998;9).
The   British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98) is the largest,
currently  available, survey of its type and was conducted between October 1997 and June 1998
(Cully   et al,  1998). It is the fourth in an on-going series of surveys: the first was the Workplace
Industrial  Relations Survey 1980 (WIRS80),  the second and third were carried out in 1984 and
1990  (WIRS84 and WIRS90). The WERS98  is very similar in construction to AWIRS95:
interviews  were conducted with a manager (with day-to-day responsibility for employee relations)
and  with a worker representative
3 (if nominated) at 2191 workplaces (all of which had more than
10  employees). Employees in these workplaces were also randomly sampled (a sample size of
28,215). All of these surveys are all fully linkable. 
The AWIRS95 was released in late 1997,  the WERS98 was released in February, 1999
so  there has been little time for studies to be undertaken using both data sets. There have been a
limited  number of comparative studies using earlier versions of these data sets (Millward  et al,
1998 ). However, the linkable employee surveys add a major, and very valuable, component to
existing  studies of tenure: providing for the possibility of separating out individual from workplace
effects on tenure.
4.  Modelling job tenure.
At  the individual level, the decision to seek and continue market employment has been well
documented  in the labour supply literature (Killingsworth, 1983). A useful set of organising
principles  for the analysis of individual worker tenure is laid out in Freeman (1980) in his
discussion of the union-exit voice  issue. These are the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of
the  current job and, in addition, the personal characteristics affecting the transactions costs of job
mobility.
The  pecuniary benefits of the current job are clearly dominated by the wage. However,
this is obviously endogenous in the determination of tenure. Freeman and numbers of other8
authors  have subsequently attempted to adjust for the simultaneity of the wage in tenure
regressions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984 and Miller and Mulvey, 1991). The workplace fixed
effects  that we allow for could influence wages and tenure, so we simplify the analysis by
estimating a reduced form and leave the exit voice issue for further work. 
Non-pecuniary  work benefits are hard to identify but we extend the range of variables used
in  the exit voice tenure studies by including variables that identify job characteristics, occupation,
and  work environment. We expect that measures of education and occupation may be correlated
with  the value of outside opportunities. Finally, demographic information which includes family
circumstances  will be highly correlated with the transactions costs of job mobility. Each of the
groups of variables is described in more detail below.
The  most important difference between our estimates and the existing literature is the
addition  of workplace fixed effects. In terms of the classification above, we can anticipate that
these  workplace effects predominantly influence the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of the
current  job and will be much less correlated with outside opportunities. To the extent that we find
these  fixed effects to be of statistical significance, this strengthens our belief in the relative
importance  of current-job-related information. In particular, this also raises the possible
importance of the labour demand or firm initiated determinants of tenure. As discussed by
Mumford  and Smith (1996 and 2000), dynamic models of labour demand (such as that outlined
by Cabellero  and Hammour, 1994) can provide predictions of the likely impact of shocks to the
demand for the  firm’s output. For example, if subject to a negative demand shock, the firm may
choose  to reduce tenure by increasing the rate of layoff whilst leaving the hiring rate unchanged.
The  costs of hiring and firing will play an important role here. In the current study, labour demand
effects on individual tenure will be captured predominantly by the workplace fixed effects.
We essentially have data from surveys at two different levels: the individual employee, and
the workplace. We will address these in turn.9
4.1.  At the individual level.
The  individual employee survey asked respondents for demographic information about themselves
(such  as age, education, number of children), factual information about their jobs (hours worked,
employer  provided training,  et cetera)  and to a lesser degree attitudinal questions about their job
and  their work environment. The overlap between these categories, especially between job
characteristics  and work environment, is major and is accentuated by the attitudinal nature of
many  of the survey questions (such as the extent of job effort and/or insecurity). We have
accordingly,  somewhat arbitrarily, blocked the summary statistics for variables for British and
Australian employees in Table 1a into demographic attributes; job characteristics; and  attitudes
to the work environment (with education and occupation controls listed separately).
Considering  Table 1a in more detail, column one presents the name of the variable,
columns  two to seven present summary statistics and column eight provides the variable
definition.  The summary statistics for the British data (presented in columns 2 through 5) are for
the  entire data set (for workplaces of 10 or more employees). However, since the Australian data
only  includes workplaces with 20 or more employees, columns 6 and 7 provide the means and
standard  deviations for the British data excluding workplaces with less than 20 employees. The
data  have been weighted by inverse sampling probabilities and thus represent the sampling
population. 
It  becomes immediately obvious that whilst the AWIRS95 and WERS98 are similar
surveys, they are  not identical. For example, with respect to tenure AWIRS95 asked for actual
years at workplace, the longest period of tenure ( tenure total) was  45 years with a mean value
of  6.1 years. The WERS98 asked respondents to choose a band (5 available bands) with a
maximum value of 10 years or more. If this latter band  is coded at 10 years, the average tenure
in  Britain ( tenure)  is 5.3 years (5.38 at larger workplaces). Treating the Australian data similarly
leads  to a lower average tenure ( tenure)  of 4.8 years. It may also be insightful to consider tenure
as  a proportion of working life, especially in a new world country such as Australia where 23%
of  the workforce are foreign born ( foreign)  and may not have been resident in the country for all10
4This calculation treats vocational training in Australia equivalent to secondary education.
of  their working life. When we carry out this calculation ( ppnten)  we see that  the average tenure
value  is now higher in Australia than Britain (22% of working life compared to some 18%). We
will return to consider the implications of these alternative measures of tenure in the  estimation
below.
The  demographic variables suggest that proportionally the Australian workforce is slightly
younger, with fewer females, a similar distribution of children  and more disabled members. The
race  variables are not very comparable. The Australian data does not provide information on race
other than for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders ( race). It does tell  us, if people were born
out  of the country ( foreign)  , what country they were born. However, this is not necessarily
revealing  of race. We also know if English is usually spoken at home ( english).  We would expect
from  the literature on discrimination (Cain, 1986, Mumford, 1989 and Joshi and Paci, 1998) and
segmented  labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) that, if these variables did have an impact
on  tenure then being young, female (especially with children), disabled, non-white, foreign born
and not natively english speaking would all lead to shorter tenure.
The  education classifications also differ across the countries but 62% of both populations
did  not proceed with formal education beyond a maximum of the end of secondary school
4.  A
very  similar proportion did degrees in the two countries, whilst Australia has more post-graduates
and  England has many more ‘others’ probably quite a few of whom did not progress beyond
primary  education. The expected relationship between education and tenure is non-linear: poorer
educated  individuals may be clustered into low quality, short tenure employment; more highly
educated  individuals face a greater range of employment opportunities and are typically more
mobile, both resulting in shorter tenure.
Considering  job characteristics, the gross hourly pay in both countries is included in Table
1a  mainly for information purposes (since, as discussed previously, it is not exogenous to tenure
and  it would not be  valid to include it amongst the explanatory variables in regression analysis,11
Brown  1989). Given the exchange rates and inflation in the time period being considered, the
average  wage in Australia is some 12% higher. The variance amongst Australian employees is
about  20% higher that  that of Britain. An increasing tendency towards wage inequality in
Australia  has been discussed by Borland (1998). Its impact on relative tenure is multi-faceted,
nevertheless,  it may at least reflect a change in the types of employment individuals face. For this
reason  we include a range of variables which reflect the non-pecuniary quality of the job: fixed
term  contract, maternity/paternity leave available and if there is employer subsidised childcare. We
believe  that permanent jobs with parental leave and childcare would be more attractive to
employees  and be associated with longer tenure. Australians are three times more likely to be on
fixed  term contracts than Britons (9% versus 3%), although almost one in two Australians have
maternity/paternity  leave available compared to roughly one in four Britons, and the relatively rare
provision  of employer subsidised childcare in Australia (3%) is virtually unheard of in Britain
(0.004%).
We also include variables measuring whether the individual is  employed part time, their
total hours worked and if they would  would prefer  to work more hours. Labour supply theory
suggests  that working generates disutility for the employee, thus the more hours demanded by the
job  the more likely the worker is to be discontent and to leave, resulting in shorter tenure
(Killingsworth, 1983).  This prediction needs to be tempered, however, by the constraints part-
time  contracts put on the labour supply choices of individuals.  In total, Australian and British
employees  on average work much the same number of hours per week (39 in Australia compared
to  37 in Britain) but there are substantially more part-time employees in Britain (25% relative to
18%).  This is reflected in 29% of the British labour market wanting to work more hours whereas
only  9% of Australians do so. The proportions of individuals receiving employer provided training
are very similar across the two countries and are substantial at around 60%.  Training funded in
this  way would be predominantly job specific in nature and is typically  associated with longer
tenure (Becker, 1975).
Occ upational choice, at an individual level, is often treated in much the same way as12
5Unions  may obviously also provide a range of other services to their members which would increase relative job
satisfaction and lower the quit rate.  One such service which has been found to have a significant positive impact
on  average tenure in the UK, but for which we do not have data, is the provision of a pension scheme (Shah, 1985
and  Henley  et al, 1994).
educational  outcome since they both reflect a range of variables, especially individual ability and
opportunity  (Filer, 1986). Our data sets only cover those currently employed so these
o ccupational choices may be also somewhat constrained. The relative size of occupational
groupings  across the two countries in our study are much the same, although  Australia has larger
numbers  in the sales and professional categories and Britain has many more in the ‘other’ group
(many  of whom are probably labourers).  We do not have strong priors concerning the impact of
occupation  on tenure. In general, we would expect less skilled occupations to be associated with
shorter  tenure. The occupation dummies will be included predominantly as control variables in
the  regression analysis and they may also help us to understand the impact of the variables
capturing the work environment.
The  work environment variables can be considered in three clusters: job related;
management  related; and trade union oriented. With the exception of whether the individual is a
union  member or an ex-member, these variables are all strongly attitudinal. More Australians
report that their jobs are  stressful (40% versus 23%), require a lot of effort (89% versus 76%)
and feel insecure about the future of their job (29% versus 19%). 
Union  membership is substantially higher in Australia (50%) than in Britain (39% or 41%
at  larger workplaces) and this difference has largely arisen in the lifetime of the workforces since
the  proportion of individuals who are or have been a member are essentially the same (58% versus
59%).  Once again we find that Australians are much more critical than are their British
counterparts with 39% being satisfied with the union compared to 69% of  the British. In terms
of  the impact of unionism on the individual, we would expect that the union would provide a
voice  mechanism for the individual thereby leading to less quits and  longer tenure (Freeman,
1980)
5.  This voice effect would be hampered if the union was primarily providing a legal service
external  to the workplace, however, which may be indicated by the lower satisfaction levels in13
Australia. 
4.2.  At the workplace level.
At the aggregate, or macro, level of  the workplace we believe that  the main economic process
determinating  average tenure is one of varying labour demand which can be captured by the
creative-destructive model of Cabellero and Hamour (1984). This model has been applied in a
series  of job reallocation papers (Blanchflower and Burgess, 1996, Mumford and Smith, 1996)
and  to job reallocation and tenure in Australia (Mumford and Smith, 2000). The latter paper
develops  the model and related arguments at length, a further more detailed exposition is available
in an appendix from the authors. 
Cabellero and Hamour (1984)  argue that the processes of  job creation and destruction
are  profit maximising responses of firms facing continuously advancing technology and exogenous
changes  in the demand for their output. Firms are assumed to introduce new technology by
creating a new production unit (a new job) which is a  bonding of a suitable worker, capital and
state-of-the-art technology.   New workers are more productive and output will be accordingly
higher.  Once created, the technological level of a job is fixed, consequently a  gap between the
worker’s productivity and that of new employees emerges over time.  If firms do not introduce
new jobs, their production processes will eventually become  outdated as the skills of the longer
tenured  members of the labour force become relatively obsolete. When a recession hits, the
derived  demand for the firm’s employees falls. The firm can reduce the size of its labour force by
either  decreasing  job creation or increasing job destruction. If it adjusts entirely via less creation,
the  incumbent employees are, at least partially, insulated from the recession and average tenure
in the workplace will rise. 
The  course chosen by the firm will depend on the nature of the costs involved in creation
and  the necessity to smooth this flow over time. This analysis suggests that average tenure is
asymmetrically  related to expected changes in demand for the output of the workplace; falls in
demand  have a positive impact which is larger than the negative impact of increases in demand14
6The  size of the alpha tenure measures (the dependent variables to be used in our final stage of estimation) do not
have  an obvious intuitive interpretation, they are derived from our first stage of estimation and will be discussed
further below.
on  tenure (and  vice versa for employment growth). Furthermore, tenure will be longer in
workplaces  that are larger,  more capital intensive, and running training programs for their
employees. These relationships will be discussed in more detail below.
The  summary statistics for the workplace data are presented in Table 1b. Once again the
data are clustered for descriptive purposes, this time into market (or economic) variables;
workforce  demographic variables; and industrial relations indicators. The data have again been
weighted by inverse sampling  probabilities and thus represent the sampling population. As with
Table 1a, the summary statistics for the British data (presented in columns  2 through 5) are for
the  entire data set (for workplaces of 10 or more employees). However, since the Australian data
only  includes workplaces with 20 or more employees, columns 6 and 7 provide the means and
standard deviations for the British data excluding workplaces with less than 20 employees. 
Considering  market characteristics
6,  the two countries were at similar positions in the
business cycles at the time of being surveyed. They had moved out of recession and were
experiencing  similar relative growth rates; each growing at 1% above their average rates for the
period  since 1980. Our data sets reveal a range of similarities and differences across the two
countries:  more Australian workplaces were experiencing either an increase or a decrease in the
demand  for their product; British workplaces are much likely to have a formal training program
in  operation (76% versus 64%); and labour costs as a proportion of total costs are slightly higher
in Australia (50% compared to 47%).
The  workplace characteristics reveal much more substantial differences: the vast majority
of  British workplaces are predominantly or totally domestically owned (94% of all, 91% of larger
workplaces  compared to 79% in Australia); there are many more multiple workplaces in Australia
(83%  compared to 70%); and Australian workplaces typically have twice as many employees
(166.5 relative to 87). 15
In  the Cabellero and Hammour (1994) framework a larger workplace would facilitate
potential  alternative job opportunities for worker’s whose jobs had become redundant, thereby
lowering  actual changes in the workforce but having little effect on average job tenure. The
literature  on labour market segmentation (Doeringer and Piore, 1971), however, suggests that
larger  workplaces have greater opportunity to develop internal job ladders and establish a system
of workplace industrial  relations (including grievance procedures) that increase job satisfaction
and  lead to lower quits, thereby increasing average tenure (Rebitzer, 1986). Furthermore, in terms
of both the models, any institutional arrangement which would increase the provision of
workplace  training (such as internal job markets) would lower job destruction and increase
average job tenure. 
The  workplace hours measures are not very comparable, in Australia they measure weekly
operating  hours at the workplace, in Britain they are the average hours worked by an employee
in  a week. The average full time wage is again similar across the two countries although the
variances  are now also similar: it would seem that the relative wage inequalities in Australia occur
predominantly within (rather than across) workplaces.  
On the basis of the predictions generated  by the Cabellero and Hammour (1984) model
it  is not clear which of the two countries will in aggregate have longer tenure since neither country
has  a stronger uniform set of market and workplace characteristics which are positively predicted
to  be associated with tenure. We will, therefore, consider the application of the model to each
country in the results section below.  
The  workforce demographics again capture the trends that we found with the individual
data. These demographic indicators  are included in both stages of estimation (discussed below)
so  that we can attempt to address effects such as being an employee of a minority group from the
overall  characteristics of the workforce (for example, is the tenure outcome of a female in a male
dominated  workplace going to be different than for a female in a female dominated workplace).16
7 Two recent studies of linked datasets on wages, tenure and employment dynamics (Bromars and Famulari, 1997,
and Bingley and Westergaad-Nielsen, 1998) also have very limited workplace information.
The  industrial relations measures are also commensurate with the individual data: the  level
of  union recognition is considerably higher in Australia (87%) than in Britain (37%).  It is
arguable  that recognition is a better measure of workplace unionism (than, for example, union
density)  impacting as it does on the union’s ability to provide an aggregate voice in negotiations
with  management. Having a written grievance procedure is much more common in Australian
workpl aces  (77% versus 50%) as was industrial action in the previous 12 months (27%
compared to 5%).  Whilst both of these last two findings may merely reflect a more formal and
legalistic  approach to industrial relations in Australia than Britain, it may also be that Australian
workplaces  are displaying greater levels of conflict which are symptomatic of more fundamental
industrial relations problems.
5.  Estimation.
The  presence of linked employee and employer workplace information allows us to estimate
models  of tenure differentials across workplaces, conditional on characteristics of individual
workers.  The linked nature of the datasets to be employed can thus be used to good effect.
Typically  individual-based datasets, whilst they may include some workplace information, do not
identify  where more than one individual in the data is employed in any given workplace.
Individual-based  datasets also, typically, have limited workplace information.
7  The model to be
estimated is:
(1) Iik’"k%Xik$i%µ ik
where  the tenure of worker  i in workplace  k ( Tik)  is explained by a set of individual characteristics
( Xik)  and a workplace fixed effect ( "k),  µik is an  iid error term. As Bromars and Famulari (1997),
Bingley  and Westergaad-Nielsen (1998), and Abowd  et al (1999) show, this equation can be
estimated  with the within estimator employed usually in panel data problems (see Greene, 1997).
Workplace  and individual effects are not assumed to be uncorrelated and it is possible to recover
the proportional contributions  of the two types of effect.  We expect both types of effect to be
important.17
8The  methods we employ could therefore be extended at a later date if, and when, another wave of WERS and/or
AWIRS become available.
If  one is prepared to go a step further and assume that the determinants of the workplace
fixed  effects and the individual characteristics are uncorrelated, it is possible to estimate the
determination of the workplace fixed effects. Estimation of:
(2) ˆ "k’a%ZkK%,k
where  the  are generated from equation (1),  Zk are workplace characteristics and  ,k is an iid error ˆ "k
term.
It  is not possible with our datasets with single cross-sections of linked worker and
workplace  information to allow for completely general, unconstrained estimation employing
individual and workplace characteristics. Abowd  et al (1999) show that under some quite
restrictive  assumptions, more progress can be made if the dataset has a panel format (ie., at least
two cross-sections over time).
8
In  evaluating the estimation results we will measure the relative explanatory contribution
of  individual and workplace effects. We can also compare estimates which omit the workplace
fixed effects (entitled OLS in  the tables) and the full estimates (entitled fixed effects or FE). An
issue that we can address by this comparison is that of segmentation.
Among  our demographic and occupational groupings we have groups who, in variety of
different  papers, have been identified as more likely to be in a different labour market segmented
from the  remainder (such as females and non-whites, see  Doeringer and Piore, 1971, Taubman
and  Wachter, 1986, and Joshi and Paci, 1998). A test of this idea can be carried out by
comparison of the coefficients between the OLS  and the fixed effects results. If a demographic
identifier  is  significant in the OLS estimates but not in the fixed effect estimates, then we can
attribute  the impact of membership of that demographic group to the workplace rather that to the
worker’s individual characteristic. This would be evidence suggesting segmentation.18
The  form of tenure model we use here is linear in the individual characteristics and
workplace  fixed effects. In common with Freeman (1980) and subsequent authors, we adopt this
first-order  Taylor approximation to a more complicated hazard function. Freeman (1980) provides
evidence in favour of this approach relative to a constant hazard model.
6.  Estimation Results
The  estimation results for models of individual worker tenure and tenure as a proportion of
working  life are given in Tables 2 and 3. For each country there are four sets of estimates. The
first  set, in columns 1 to 4 of Tables 2 and 3 are for raw job tenure. Columns 1 and 3 contain the
basic  results. These are estimates using OLS allowing for the individuals effects (demographic,
job  characteristics, workforce environment, occupation and education) in column 1 and
additionally  allowing for fixed workplace effects in column 3. The Australian results are given in
Table 2, those for Britain in Table 3.
Analysis of the fit of these models is given in summary at the bottom of  Tables 2 and 3.
A more detailed analysis of variance is carried out in Table 4. Comparison of columns 1 and 2 in
both Tables 2 and 3  shows that both individuals’ and workplace effects are important in
explaining  the variation in individual worker tenure. Table 4 shows us that, for Australia the two
s ets explain 43.9% of the variation in tenure. Individuals’ characteristics explain 26.6% by
themselves  and workplace effects 27.7%. On the margin the two sets explain roughly equal
amounts;  16.2 and 17.3%, respectively.  Comparison with the results for Britain in Table 3
indicates  a remarkable similarity in the overall level of fit and the relative contribution, both on
averag e and on the margin, of the two groups of characteristics. If anything, the relative
importance of workplace effects is a little greater in Britain than in Australia.
In  the worker tenure regressions we have identified  distinctions  between individual
human  capital and demographic characteristics; features of the particular job that the worker has;
and  their work environment. Previous studies (eg Bromars and Famulari, 1997) have only had
access to demographics. All three groups of variables can  be seen to be important in explaining19
job  tenure. Education, gender and race are all significant as are occupation, full or part-time
status,  hours worked and a number of job related and work environment related attitudinal
variables.  All three groups of explanatory variables interact with the impact of the workplace in
which the worker is.
The education effects demonstrate that educational attainment is broadly negatively related
to  tenure. The impact of gender and race on tenure provides an interesting comparison between
the  OLS and fixed effects results. The OLS results for both Australia and Britain indicate a
significant  negative female gender effect on tenure. They also show shorter tenure for those  from
a   non-Australian or Aboriginal and Torres Straight Island background for Australia and non-
white  background for Britain. Part-time workers also have shorter tenure. These effects are all
much reduced in size and significance in the fixed effects results. Controlling for the workplace
fixed  effects shows that analysis of data on individuals alone would mistakenly attribute the
negative   impact of the type of workplace where any member of either of these groups works to
their  gender or racial background or whether they are part-time. Indeed, for those with an
Aboriginal  and Torres Straight Islands background, the impact of racial background is
insignificant  once the workplace fixed effect is included. Similar arguments could be made for the
impact  of some occupational groupings. These results provide some support for the idea of
segmented labour markets discussed above.
As  with any analysis of a specific regression model, questions of robustness arise. The first
concerns  worker age.  There is a strong relationship in the estimation results between tenure and
age  (this is commonly found in the literature, see Burgess 1998). The coefficients over-estimate
the behavioural impact of age given the obvious direct functional relationship  between the two.
In  addition, this effect is further confused for those who have shorter tenure solely because they
were  adult migrants into the country concerned. This is of most importance for Australia where
23%  of the sample were not born in the country. We attempt to allow for these two effects by
defining  a new dependent variable which is current job tenure as a proportion of working life
beyond  the age of 15 or arrival as a migrant. Results for our OLS and fixed-effects regression20
9The degrees of freedom of these two regressions are very similar making them comparable.
models  are given in columns 5 and 7 in Tables 2 and 3 with analysis of variance in Table 4. Many
of  the results are similar to those for the raw definition of tenure. A strong positive relationship
with  age remains, suggesting that it is behavioural. Also the impact of race and origin are of
similar orders of magnitude and significance.
Considering  Table 4, which contains further analysis of variance, in more detail. The
results for the two measures of tenure are  examined for each of the two countries. In each case
we  distinguish between the contributions of worker and job characteristics on the one hand, and
workplace  effects, on the other. For Australia, the fixed effects estimation results show that some
44%  of the variation in raw job tenure across workers is explained by worker and job
characteristics and workplace effects  together. This falls to 33% for the measure of tenure as a
proportion  of working life. The individual contributions to the overall fit of these two groups are
similar  for the raw measure of tenure at about 27%. They are also similar on the margin at around
17%.
9  The similarity of these figures with the results for Britain is striking. Of a slightly lower
overall  level of fit, the workplace fixed effects are a little more important for Britain.
Unsurprisingly,  the fit of the equations for the alternative measure of tenure are lower than for the
raw  measure as we have offset much of the impact of the individual’s age. The relative importance
of  the workplace fixed effects is increased, although more for Britain than for Australia.
Comparison  with results for the US in Bromars and Famulari (1997) shows a somewhat greater
relative  contribution of worker characteristics. However, they only have a sample of 240
establishments  which may explain the reduced relative role of establishment fixed effects in their
results.
According  to our results in Table 4, tenure is positively correlated across workers in any
given  workplace, conditional on the individual characteristics of the workers and the jobs they are
in.  Also, conditional differences in tenure across workplaces are quite large. In Australia (Britain)
workplaces  with average tenure one standard deviation above the overall mean, conditional on
worker  characteristics, have tenure rates 1.7 (1.6) years longer than the average of 4.8 (5.3) years.21
10 For the British results, increased demand  means that the workplaces financial performance was better or a lot
better  than average. For the Australian  results, increased demand means demand for wp main product is
expanding.  Whilst not identical, these variables both capture changes in workplace product market performance.
There  does not, however, appear to be significant evidence that long tenure workers sort
themselves  into long tenure workplaces in either country. The simple correlation between
workplace  average worker and job characteristics and workplaces fixed effects is 0.082 for the
raw  measure of tenure in Australia and 0.195 in Britain. These figures are much smaller than that
found  for the US  by Bromars and Famulari of 0.221. The largest correlations between individual
worker  and job characteristics and workplace fixed effects are those for gender, racial
background, and some occupations. These results indicate some labour market segmentation.
Next  we consider models of the workplace fixed-effects, that is average tenure in the
workplace  conditioning on the demographic and job characteristics of the workers concerned. The
estimates  are given in Table 5. The determination of the workplace fixed effects show interesting
differences  to the estimates for raw average tenure. As we would expect, many of the workforce-
specific  variables are much less significant. However, the corollary of the results in Table 3 for
individual  workers tenure is that workplaces with higher numbers of female, foreign born, younger
or part-time workers have shorter average tenure. 
Output  demand effects have a significant impact on workplace average tenure
10 .
Conditional and unconditional estimates of these  effects are very similar, for both countries.  In
all  results, the impact of positive demand changes is to reduce average tenure. As the model
evaluated  by Mumford and Smith (2000) shows; positive demand shocks will result in reduced
average  tenure if workplaces predominantly choose to adjust the level of labour demand upwards
by increasing hiring rather than reducing hiring. 
Conversely,  it appears from our results that reduced demand also results in lower average
tenure  in Britain whilst having no significant effect in Australia. This suggests that in downturns,
workplaces  employ both reduced hiring and increased firing in both countries with some evidence
that  insulation of the incumbent workers is greater in Australia than in Britain. This is consistent22
11 F-tests  for the exclusion of industry effects for Australia (15) and Britain (11) across the column of Table 5 are:
2.78, 11.43, 4.97, all distributed F(15, 1036) and 3.17, 4.47,  4.60 all distributed F(11, 1254). All are signficant
at the 1% level.
with  the view that the industrial relations systems in Australia places a higher cost on firing than
the more heavily reformed system in Britain.
Our results show that larger more capital intensive workplaces have longer tenure,
although size has  a less significant impact on average tenure in British workplaces. This may be
related  to the size distribution of workplaces in the respective datasets. If the positive impact of
size  on tenure only appears above a given size, the larger average size of the Australian
workplaces in the sample may allow this effect to be significant in the Australian data.
Union  activity is an important feature of workplace average tenure. Without conditioning
on  worker characteristics such as union membership, union recognition adds significantly to
average  tenure as does the existence of workplace grievance procedures. Again, these effects are
much  reduced in size in the conditional workplace tenure results (especially for Australia) but they
remain  significant for Britain. This results suggests that the union voice mechanism works to
increase  tenure at both the worker and workplace level in Britain. In Australia, the voice effect
is  strong at the worker level but not impacting at the workplace level perhaps due to the more
legalistic industrial relations process replacing the role of the union at this level.
Finally, in  common with Bromars and Fumulari (1997), we find that workplace average
tenure  (both conditional and unconditional) is significantly affected by the industry in which the
workplace  operates. From Table 5 it can be seen that there are some country differences between
sectors
11 .  In Australia, some industries have significantly longer tenure than the missing public
sector  category: in particular, manufacturing, education, electricity and gas, and the retail sectors.
In  Britain, however, several industries have significantly lower tenure than the missing public
sector  category. Workplaces in the transport and health sectors have the lowest average tenure,
whilst non are significantly higher than the public sector23
7.  Conclusion
This  paper has examined the determination of individual and workplace tenure employing two
new datasets. These datasets provide linked  employee-workplace data which has allowed for a
much more complete analysis of the determinants of job tenure.
Using  a fixed effects estimator, we find that a range of demographic and educational, job
related, occupation and work environment variables are  important for explaining individual job
tenure.  In addition, workplace fixed effects explain as much of the variation in individual tenure
as  the individual characteristics. These two groups of variables are essentially uncorrelated.
However,  we do find that the negative impact of gender and race on tenure that is well
documented  in the existing literature and appears strongly significant in OLS estimates excluding
workplace  effects, is offset when workplace effects are included. We interpret this as evidence in
favour of job segmentation.
We find that there are important differences between Britain and Australia in this regard.
Whilst  the impact of both gender and race on tenure are fully offset in the British fixed effects
results,  this is not true in the Australian results. Despite the much larger gender and race effects
on  tenure found in the Australian OLS results, these are only partially offset by the workplace
effects. This result  may be related to continuing differences in the respective industrial relations
systems.  The more formal and legalistic Australian system may have limited the extent of the
segmentation which appears to occur in Britain.
We find strong evidence of a positive impact of union membership on individual job
tenure.  This is consistent with the union voice literature, although our approach is different to
those  studies. Analysis of average workplace tenure unconditionally and conditional on the
individual  effects in the individual tenure models (ie the fixed effects) suggests that the impact of
unions  is predominantly through individual membership. Our unconditional results show
significant  effects from union recognition and the existence of written grievance procedures.
These  effects reduce in size and significance in the conditional analysis. This is true for Australia24
and Britain, although there is a remaining effect of union  recognition in Britain, again reflecting
differences in the industrial relations systems.
Our  results also demonstrate the extent of the missing variable problem in the initial
analyses  of individual job tenure exemplified by the union voice literature. The impacts of gender
and  race being the most important effects incorrectly estimated. Equally, however, the apparent
near  orthogonality of the remaining variables with the firm fixed effects means that the impact of
the  remaining individual variables is not altered. In particular, the union membership effect is
robust  which suggests support for the union voice effects on job tenure. A structural estimation
of this model using linked data is clearly an avenue for future research.
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Table 1a.  Summary statistics for the employee data.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition
Dependent Variable >19 employees
Australian
tenure total 6.12 6.23 0.50  45.00   total years at workplace
ppnten total 0.25 0.24 0.01  1.00  total tenure as proportion of working life
tenure 4.84 3.64 0.5 10  years at workplace, max 10 years
ppnten 0.22 0.19 0.01 1.00  tenure (max 10) as proportion of working life
British
tenure 5.32 3.64 0.5 10  5.38 3.63 years at workplace (mid points 5 bands) max 10 years
ppnten 0.18 0.13 0.01 1.00  0.19 0.13 tenure as proportion of working life
Demographics
Australian
age 37.37 11.41 17.5  57.5  midpoints of individuals age bands (9 bands)
female 0.45 0.5 0.00  1.00  female
child04 0.14 0.35 0.00  1.00  dep child aged 0-4
child512 0.21 0.41 0.00  1.00  dep child aged 5-12
child13 0.19 0.39 0.00  1.00  dep child aged13-18
disabled 0.1 0.31 0.00  1.00  health problem or disability likely to last more 6 months
race 0.02 0.13 0.00  1.00  Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander
foreign 0.23 0.42 0.00  1.00  not born in Australia
English speaking 0.94 0.24 0.00  1.00  English language usually spoken at home
British
age 39.64 11.63 20  60  39.72 11.55 midpoints of  individuals age bands (7 bands)
female 0.49 0.5 0.00  1.00  0.49 0.5 female
child04 0.14 0.35 0.00  1.00  0.14 0.35 dep child aged 0-4
child511 0.2 0.39 0.00  1.00  0.2 0.4 dep child aged 5-11
child12 0.19 0.4 0.00  1.00  0.19 0.4 dep child aged12-18
disabled 0.06 0.24 0.00  1.00  0.06 0.24 long standing health problem or disability
race 0.04 0.2 0.00  1.00  0.04 0.2 not white28
Table 1a.  Summary statistics for the employee data.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition
Education >19 employees
Australian 
primary 0.03 0.16 0.00  1.00  primary school, highest education level attained ...
some secondary 0.28 0.45 0.00  1.00  some secondary school education
secondary 0.19 0.39 0.00  1.00  completed secondary school
vocational 0.15 0.36 0.00  1.00  skilled or basic vocational qualifications
diploma/certificate 0.09 0.29 0.00  1.00  assoc diploma or advanced certificate
degree 0.14 0.35 0.00  1.00  undergrad degree/diploma,
post grad 0.11 0.31 0.00  1.00  postgrad degree or diploma
other educ 0.02 0.15 0.00  1.00  have other educ qual
British
CSE 0.12 0.33 0.00  1.00  0.12 0.33 CSE or equiv, GCSE (grades D-G), highest education ...
O-level 0.26 0.44 0.00  1.00  0.26 0.44 O level or equiv, GCSE (grades A-C)
A-level 0.15 0.35 0.00  1.00  0.15 0.35 A level or equiv
degree 0.16 0.36 0.00  1.00  0.16 0.36 degree or equiv
post grad 0.05 0.23 0.00  1.00  0.05 0.23 post grad degree or equiv
other educ 0.26 0.44 0.00  1.00  0.26 0.44 have other educ qual
Job characteristics
Australian
ghpay 15.82 15.39 0.53  875  gross hourly pay (23 bands)
fixed term 0.09 0.28 0.00  1.00  on a fixed term contract
matern/patern avail 0.48 0.5 0.00  1.00  maternity  or paternity leave available
kidcare 0.03 0.17 0.00  1.00  employer subsidised childcare available
part time 0.18 0.38 0.00  1.00  work < 30 hours per week
total hours 0.39 13.75 0.5  168  total hours worked in norm week, incl overtime
prefer more hours 0.09 0.29 0.00  1.00  prefer more hours
employer job train 0.61 0.49 0.00  1.00  employer has provided job training
British
ghpay 7.26 7.17 0.83  610.01  7.03 7.18 gross hourly pay (12 bands)
fixed term 0.03 0.02 0.00  1.00  0.03 0.18 job is fixed term29
Table 1a.  Summary statistics for the employee data.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition
>19 employees
matern/patern avail 0.27 0.44 0.00  1.00  0.28 0.45 parental leave available
kidcare 0.004 0.06 0.00  1.00  0.004 0.06 wp nursery or employer subsidised childcare available
part time 0.26 0.44 0.00  1.00  0.25 0.43 work < 30 hours per week
total hours 36.59 12.92 0.5  125  36.98 12.65 total hours worked in norm week, incl overtime
prefer more hours 0.28 0.45 0.00  1.00  0.29 0.45 work extra hours because enjoy or need money
employer job train 0.59 0.49 0.00  1.00  0.6 0.49 employer paid for or organised job training
Occupation
Australian
labourer 0.16 0.35 0.00  1.00  labourer and related workers
operator 0.08 0.27 0.00  1.00  plant & machine operator and drivers
sales 0.14 0.35 0.00  1.00  sales and personal service workers
clerk 0.18 0.38 0.00  1.00  clerical and secretarial
trades 0.08 0.27 0.00  1.00  tradespersons and apprentices
assoc profs 0.11 0.32 0.00  1.00  para (associate) professional
profs 0.17 0.38 0.00  1.00  professionals
managers 0.07 0.26 0.00  1.00  managers
other occup 0.01 0.09  0.00  1.00  other occupational groups
British
operative 0.13 0.34 0.00  1.00  0.14 0.35 operative and assembly
sales 0.1 0.3 0.00  1.00  0.09 0.29 sales operator, sales assistant
personal 0.08 0.28 0.00  1.00  0.08 0.27 personal and protective services
craft 0.1 0.31 0.00  1.00  0.1 0.3 craft and skilled service
clerk 0.16 0.37 0.00  1.00  0.16 0.36 clerical and secretarial
assoc prof 0.09 0.29 0.00  1.00  0.09 0.29 associate professional and technical
profs 0.13 0.34 0.00  1.00  0.13 0.34 professionals
managers 0.09 0.28 0.00  1.00  0.08 0.28 managers and senior administrators
other occup 0.12 0.33 0.00  1.00  0.12 0.33 other occupational group30
Table 1a.  Summary statistics for the employee data.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition
Work environment >19 employees
Australian
job stress 0.4 0.49 0.00  1.00  job is very stressful
job effort 0.89 0.32 0.00  1.00  put a lot of effort into job
job insecurity 0.29 0.45 0.00  1.00  feel insecure about future at this workplace
union member  0.5 0.5 0.00  1.00  still a union member at this wp
exunion 0.08 0.26 0.00  1.00  was a union member at this wp
satunion 0.39 0.49 0.00  1.00  overall satisfied with the service union provides at this wp
British
job stress 0.23 0.42 0.00  1.00  0.23 0.42 worry a lot about job outside working hours
job effort 0.76 0.43 0.00  1.00  0.76 0.43  job requires respondent to work very hard
job insecurity 0.19 0.4 0.00  1.00  0.2 0.4 feel job is insecure at this wp
union member 0.39 0.49 0.00  1.00  0.41 0.49 is a union (or staff association) member
exunion 0.18 0.39 0.00  1.00  0.18 0.39 has previously been a union member
satunion 0.69 0.46 0.00  1.00  0.69 0.46 union makes a difference to what it is like to work here
no. of observations British 28215 Aus 19155 British 26927 weighted by inverse sampling probabilities.
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Table 1b.  Summary statistics for the workplace data.




alpha tenure -1.63  1.71  -7.71  5.06  from the fixed effect tenure regression
alpha ppnten 0.15  0.09  -0.12  0.89  from the fixed effect ppn tenure regress
British
alpha tenure -3.17  1.55  -7.79  1.12  -3.17  1.55  from the fixed effect tenure regression
alpha ppnten 0.17  0.07  -0.01  0.38  0.17  0.06  from the fixed effect ppn tenure regress
Market characteristics
Australian
inc demand 0.53  0.50  0.00  1.00  demand for wp main product expanding
dec demand 0.11  0.32  1  0.00  demand for wp main product contracting
training 0.64  0.48  0.00  1.00  formal training scheme operates
labour cost 0.50  0.26  0.10  0.90  labour costs as proportion of total costs 
British
inc demand 0.49  0.50  0.00  1.00  0.51  0.50  wp financial performance better/a lot better than ave
dec demand 0.02  0.14  1  0.00  0.03  0.16  wp financial performance worse/a lot worse than ave
training 0.76  0.43  0.00  1.00  0.81  0.40  formal training scheme operates
labour cost 0.46  0.28  0.13  0.88  0.47  0.28  labour costs as proportion of total costs (4bands)
WP characteristics
Australian
Aus own 0.79  0.41  0.00  1.00  predominantly or totally Australian owned
multi wp 0.83  0.38  0.00  1.00  wp is one of multiple wps in enterprise
wp size 166.53  304.47  6.00 3979.00  employees on pay 12 months previously
wp hours 81.96  50.01  17.50  168.00  hours per week wp operates
ave full time wage 33816.20  11039.12  13000  104000  average annual full time wp earnings 
British
UK owned 0.94  0.24  0.00  1.00  0.91  0.28  predominantly or totally UK owned
multi wp 0.68  0.47  0.00  1.00  0.70  0.46  wp is one of multiple wps in enterprise32
Table 1b.  Summary statistics for the workplace data.
Variable Mean S.Dev. Min Max Mean S.Dev. Definition
>19 employees
wp size 60.49  233.61  10  30995  87.15  289.95  employees on pay 12 months previously
wp hours 38.52  8.51  1.00  97.00  38.67  8.44  total normal weekly hours worked
ave full time wage 16116  7734  2600  35361  16221  7725  average annual full time wp earnings
Demographics
Australian
female 0.45  0.28  0.00  1  proportion of the workforce female
race 0.02  0.05  0.00  0.75  proportion of the workforce aboriginal or TSI
no eng 0.12  0.18  0.00  0.75  proportion not speaking English at home
part 0.27  0.31  0.00  1  proportion of the workforce part time
disabled 0.03  0.06  0.00  0.75  proportion of the workforce disabled
youth 0.10  0.16  0.00  0.75  proportion of the workforce below 21
old 0.14  0.17  0.00  0.75  proportion of the workforce over 50
British
female 0.54  0.31  0.00  1.00  0.53  0.30  proportion of the workforce female
ethnic 0.04  0.10  0.00  0.89  0.05  0.11  proportion of the workforce ethnic
part 0.32  0.30  0.00  1.00  0.31  0.29  proportion of the workforce part time
disabled 0.01  0.02  0.00  0.86  0.01  0.02  proportion of the workforce disabled
youth 0.08  0.14  0.00  0.89  0.08  0.13  proportion of the workforce below 21
old 0.15  0.12  0.00  0.86  0.14  0.11  proportion of the workforce over 50
IR measures
Australian
union recognised 0.87  0.34  0.00  1.00  union recognised in negotiation
grievance procedure 0.77  0.42  0.00  1.00  written grievance procedure
industrial action 0.27  0.44  0.00  1.00  industrial action in previous 12 months
British
union recognised 0.39  0.49  0.00  1.00  0.43  0.5  union recognised in negotiation
grievance procedure 0.50  0.50  0.00  1.00  0.54  0.50  written grievance procedure
industrial action 0.05  0.22  0.00  1.00  0.05  0.22  industrial action in previous 12 months33
Table 1b.  Summary statistics for the workplace data.




mining 0.01  0.12  0.00  1.00  mining
manufacturing 0.17  0.37  0.00  1.00  manufacturing
electrical 0.01  0.11  0.00  1.00  electrical gas
construction 0.03  0.16  0.00  1.00  construction
wholesale 0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00  wholesale
retail 0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00  retail
accommodation 0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  accommodation
transport 0.04  0.19  0.00  1.00  transport
communications 0.02  0.14  0.00  1.00  communications
finance 0.04  0.19  0.00  1.00  finance
property 0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  property
government 0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00  government services
educ 0.11  0.31  0.00  1.00  education
health 0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00  health
sport 0.03  0.17  0.00  1.00  sport and recreation
pers 0.03  0.17  0.00  1  personal services
British
manufacturing 0.13  0.34  0.00  1.00  0.15  0.36  manufacturing
construction 0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00  0.03  0.18  construction
electrical 0.01  0.05  0  1  0.00  0.06  electrical
wholesale 0.19  0.39  0.00  1.00  0.19  0.40  wholesale
hotels 0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  0.07  0.26  hotels
transport 0.05  0.21  0.00  1.00  0.05  0.22  transport
finance 0.03  0.17  0.00  1.00  0.03  0.17  finance
other business 0.11  0.32  0.00  1.00  0.10  0.29  other business
education 0.13  0.34  0.00  1.00  0.14  0.34  education
public 0.05  0.21  0  1  0.05  0.22  public services
health 0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00  0.14  0.34  health
other 0.05  0.22  0.00  1.00  0.04  0.2  other
no. of observations British 2192 Aus 2001 British 2016 data weighted by inverse sampling probabilities.34
Table 2.  Australian employee tenure.
OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect
tenure Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
tenure proportion tenure
Demographics
age 0.218  11.55  0.221  11.94  0.010  9.61  0.011  10.03 
age
2 *100 -0.115  -4.69    -0.130  -5.49    -0.014  -10.37    -0.015  -11.10 
female -0.431  -6.31  -0.303  -4.40  -0.015  -3.92  -0.011  -2.66 
child04 0.214  2.24  0.215  2.42  0.020  3.74  0.021  4.07 
child512 -0.020  -0.29  -0.047  -0.71  -0.006  -1.57  -0.006  -1.67 
child13 -0.028  -0.38  -0.048  -0.70  -0.006  -1.40  -0.007  -1.70 
female*child04 0.030  0.18  -0.027  -0.18  -0.001  -0.09  -0.004  -0.50 
disabled 0.242  2.71  0.260  3.12  -0.000  -0.05  -0.000  -0.10 
Aborigine (race) -0.447  -1.77  -0.098  -0.40  0.018  1.25  0.025  1.73 
Aus born 0.242  3.76  0.184  2.95  -0.152  -42.42  -0.148  -41.32 
Eng speaking 0.100  0.90  0.198  1.79  -0.021  -3.39  0.006  1.00 
Education
some secondary -0.390  -2.02  -0.383  -2.11  -0.008  -0.77  -0.001  -0.12 
secondary -0.595  -2.99  -0.511  -2.72  -0.007  -0.60  0.002  0.19 
vocational -0.814  -4.04  -0.802  -4.20  -0.004  -0.38  0.001  0.12 
diploma/certificate -0.745  -3.53  -0.808  -4.03  0.002  0.13  0.005  0.46 
under graduate -1.224  -5.76  -1.259  -6.25  -0.010  -0.87  -0.009  -0.73 
post graduate -1.364  -6.21  -1.429  -6.80  0.001  0.05  0.001  0.10 
other education -0.830  -3.12  -1.000  -4.01  0.009  0.60  0.006  0.42 
Job characteristics
fixed term -1.220  -12.73  -1.301  -13.68  -0.048  -8.90  -0.045  -8.27 
parental leave avail 0.532  8.92  0.489  8.39  0.020  5.91  0.020  5.87 
kidcare -0.226  -1.39  0.081  0.52  0.021  2.32  0.032  3.60 
part time -0.404  -2.90  -0.277  -2.02  -0.030  -3.88  -0.027  -3.49 
total hours*10 -0.083  -1.03    -0.083  -0.98    0.002  0.48    -0.001  -0.25 
total hours2*1000 0.065  0.01    0.065  0.89    -0.005  -1.28    -0.000  -0.11 
prefer more hours -0.592  -5.68  -0.602  -6.10  -0.013  -2.26  -0.012  -2.12 
training -0.369  -6.61  -0.434  -7.90  -0.018  -5.80  -0.017  -5.43 35
Table 2.  Australian employee tenure.
OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect
tenure Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
tenure proportion tenure
Occupation
operator 0.401  3.36  0.189  1.56  0.008  1.24  0.006  0.90 
sales 0.067  0.60  0.153  1.27  -0.007  -1.17  -0.002  -0.22 
clerk 0.197  1.90  0.298  2.71  -0.007  -1.26  0.001  0.23 
trades 0.978  7.65  0.874  6.70  0.032  4.46  0.035  4.65 
assoc professional 0.429  3.70  0.630  5.13  -0.002  -0.35  0.013  1.80 
professional 0.415  3.22  0.407  3.08  -0.019  -2.62  -0.009  -1.15 
managers 0.370  2.75  0.586  4.38  -0.007  -0.93  0.007  0.96 
other occupation 0.079  0.25  0.120  0.40  0.001  0.05  0.012  0.72 
Work environment
job stress 0.486  8.57  0.534  9.90  0.019  5.97  0.022  7.04 
job effort -0.116  -1.38  -0.047  -0.60  -0.012  -2.53  -0.009  -2.04 
insecure 0.103  1.72  -0.035  -0.61  0.002  0.51  -0.004  -1.05 
union member 1.026  18.13  0.923  14.34  0.032  10.05  0.034  9.06 
constant -1.405  -3.14  0.198  7.92 
Number of obs 15742  15742  15742  15742 
F( 38, 15703) 149.40  F( 38, 13885) 104.92  F( 38, 15703) 85.62  F( 38, 13885) 66.01 
Prob > F      0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
R-squared     0.27  0.44  0.17  0.33 
Adj R-squared 0.26  0.37  0.17  0.24 
Root MSE      3.30  2.89  0.18  0.17 36
Table 3.  British employee tenure.
tenure OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
tenure proportional tenure
Demographics
age 0.321  18.03  0.303  17.84  0.004  5.17  0.003  4.16 
age
2 *100 -0.256  -11.64    -0.245  -11.72    -0.007  -8.13    -0.007  -7.80 
female -0.111  -1.94  0.043  0.74  -0.004  -1.80  0.001  0.22 
child04 -0.003  -0.04  -0.021  -0.25  0.005  1.42  0.003  1.02 
child512 -0.047  -0.75  -0.058  -0.98  -0.002  -0.95  -0.003  -1.36 
child13 -0.293  -4.71  -0.316  -5.40  -0.012  -4.79  -0.013  -5.37 
female*child04 0.467  3.50  0.492  3.94  0.021  3.95  0.022  4.43 
disabled 0.257  2.50  0.227  2.36  0.007  1.84  0.005  1.31 
race -0.486  -3.94  -0.174  -1.42  -0.026  -5.33  -0.012  -2.51 
Education
olevel -0.121  -1.42  -0.118  -1.48  -0.006  -1.89  -0.006  -1.96 
alevel -0.315  -3.36  -0.310  -3.50  -0.014  -3.68  -0.013  -3.68 
degree -1.003  -10.12  -0.932  -9.80  -0.047  -11.96  -0.043  -11.34 
postgrad -1.479  -11.73  -1.367  -11.23  -0.062  -12.49  -0.056  -11.63 
other education 0.012  0.13  0.001  0.01  -0.007  -1.90  -0.007  -2.08 
Job characteristics
fixed term -1.447  -10.76  -1.624  -12.34  -0.058  -10.93  -0.066  -12.53 
parental leave avail 0.688  2.19  0.563  1.86  0.024  1.91  0.019  1.56 
kidcare 0.185  3.53  0.114  2.24  0.007  3.55  0.005  2.24 
part time -0.466  -6.42  -0.380  -5.28  -0.019  -6.56  -0.016  -5.52 
total hours*10 0.163  2.42    -0.067  -0.96    0.006  2.33    -0.002  -0.80 
total hours2*1000 -0.199  -2.18    0.121  1.30    -0.009  -2.45    0.004  1.00 
prefer more hours 0.065  1.12  -0.002  -0.04  0.002  0.91  -0.001  -0.24 
training -0.370  -7.18  -0.392  -7.58  -0.015  -7.56  -0.016  -7.84 37
Table 3.  British employee tenure.
tenure OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
tenure proportional tenure
Occupation
sales -0.167  -1.33  0.230  1.50  -0.011  -2.25  0.004  0.63 
personal services -0.567  -4.52  0.165  1.09  -0.024  -4.75  0.002  0.31 
skilled/crafts 0.572  5.01  0.593  4.83  0.022  4.81  0.021  4.31 
clerk 0.034  0.32  0.491  4.12  0.004  0.86  0.018  3.76 
assoc professional 0.303  2.63  0.669  5.24  0.011  2.36  0.023  4.50 
professional 0.512  4.31  0.877  6.78  0.017  3.61  0.029  5.56 
manager 0.144  1.21  0.771  6.13  0.007  1.51  0.028  5.69 
other occupation -0.405  -3.54  0.040  0.32  -0.015  -3.23  0.000  0.08 
Work environment
job stress 0.192  3.49  0.302  5.84  0.007  3.12  0.012  5.75 
job effort 0.169  2.95  0.166  3.06  0.005  2.32  0.005  2.33 
insecure 0.056  0.98  -0.006  -0.10  0.003  1.38  0.000  0.01 
union member 1.356  27.16  1.206  20.31  0.049  24.75  0.044  18.50 
constant -3.327  -9.01  0.161  11.04 
Number of obs 20554  20554  20554  20554 
F( 34, 20519) 192.74  F( 34, 18898) 128.54  F( 34, 20519) 75.11  F( 34, 18898) 58.79 
Prob > F      0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
R-squared     0.24  0.4  0.11  0.27 
Adj R-squared 0.24  0.34  0.11  0.21 
Root MSE      3.28  2.93  0.13  0.12 38
Table 4. Variance decomposition.
          Tenure Proportion Tenure
Aus Britain Aus Britain
Fraction of variance explained
worker and job characteristics
and workplace fixed effects
0.439 0.395 0.328 0.274
worker and job characteristics 0.266 0.242 0.172 0.111
(number) 38 34 38 34
workplace effects 0.277 0.255 0.206 0.198
(number) 1819 1622 1819 1622
Marginal fraction of variance explained
worker and job characteristics 0.162 0.14 0.122 0.076
workplace fixed effects 0.173 0.153 0.156 0.163
Standard deviations
worker and job characteristics
     across workers









workplace fixed effects 1.74  1.53 0.09 0.059
Correlations
worker and job characteristics
     across workplaces
     and workplace fixed effects
0.082 0.195 0.05 0.01539
Table 5. Workplace tenure
Australian Britain
OLS tenure FE tenure FE Ppn tenure OLS tenure FE tenure FE Ppn tenure
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Market characteristics
increasing demand -0.258  -1.53  -0.239  -2.11  -0.014  -2.57  -0.387  -3.99  -0.345  -4.11  -0.016  -4.77 
decreasing demand -0.352  -1.3  0.069  0.38  0  -0.26  -0.618  -1.96  -0.589  -2.16  -0.026  -2.36 
training -0.044  -0.27  0.183  1.66  0.011  2.14  -0.158  -1.21  -0.033  -0.29  0.001  0.17 
labour cost 0.618  1.61  -0.334  -1.29  -0.028  -2.23  -0.002  -0.84  -0.004  -1.85  -0.000  -1.39 
WP characteristics
foreign owned -0.168  -0.62  0.097  0.54  -0.003  -0.36  -0.141  -0.77  0.015  0.10  -0.000  -0.07 
multiple workplaces -0.032  -0.12  0.053  0.29  -0.001  -0.11  0.112  0.96  0.038  0.38  -0.002  -0.39 
workplace size*1000 -0.063  -0.25    0.478  2.83    0.020  2.40    0.253  1.56    0.252  1.79    0.009  1.61 
wp hours *100 0.164  0.86    0.049  0.38    0.009  1.36    0.009  1.56    0.006  1.12    0.000  1.17 
Demographics
ppn female -1.391  -3.10    -0.574  -1.90    -0.010  -0.65    0.256  0.90    0.038  0.16    0.017  1.69 
race                -2.214  -1.48  -3.180  -3.16  -0.097  -1.99  -2.072  -4.52  -1.612  -4.07  -0.080  -5.05 
no English at home 0.085  0.18  0.317  0.99  0.054  3.49 
ppn part time -0.648  -1.48    -0.137  -0.47    -0.001  -0.07    -0.920  -3.26  -0.376  -1.54  -0.020  -2.06 
ppn disabled 6.332  3.80  2.469  2.20  0.059  1.09  -0.572  -0.32  0.640  0.41  0.038  0.61 
ppn < 20 -5.906  -7.32  -1.235  -2.27  -0.066  -2.51  -1.843  -3.86  1.024  2.48  0.029  1.76 
ppn > 50 4.164  7.25  0.662  1.71  0.036  1.92  5.489  12.03  2.866  7.27  0.133  8.44 
Industrial relations
union recognition 0.504  2.27  -0.152  -1.02  -0.006  -0.83  0.847  6.37  0.275  2.39  0.009  1.87 
grievance procedure 0.518  2.34  0.112  0.75  -0.008  -1.05  0.445  4.00  0.233  2.43  0.011  2.95 
industrial action 0.499  2.84  -0.048  -0.40  -0.006  -1.02  0.558  2.66  0.432  2.39  0.014  1.87 40
Table 5. Workplace tenure
Australian Britain
OLS tenure FE tenure FE Ppn tenure OLS tenure FE tenure FE Ppn tenure
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Industry
manufacturing 0.885  2.57  0.529  2.29  0.030  2.69  0.087  0.31  0.111  0.46  -0.004  -0.36 
construction 0.838  1.60  -0.567  -1.61  -0.022  -1.30  -0.020  -0.06  0.018  0.06  -0.001  -0.05 
electrical 2.391  3.93  1.349  3.30  0.053  2.65  0.132  0.14  0.219  0.27  -0.001  -0.04 
wholesale -0.013  -0.02  -0.182  -0.51  0.008  0.48  -0.163  -0.58  -0.079  -0.32  -0.011  -1.16 
transport -0.005  -0.01  -0.422  -1.36  -0.014  -0.90  -0.660  -2.03  -0.714  -2.54  -0.038  -3.34 
finance -0.279  -0.66  -0.412  -1.45  -0.012  -0.87  -0.023  -0.07  -0.012  -0.04  -0.008  -0.68 
education 0.239  0.70  0.472  2.06  0.005  0.48  0.138  0.54  0.075  0.34  -0.012  -1.34 
health -0.003  -0.01  0.398  1.40  0.011  0.78  -0.724  -2.72  -0.738  -3.21  -0.038  -4.10 
hotels -0.314  -0.97  -0.255  -0.91  -0.027  -2.44 
other business -0.399  -1.40  -0.242  -0.98  -0.020  -1.98 
UK other 0.111  0.33  0.287  0.99  0.001  0.06 
retail 0.770  1.68  0.818  2.66  0.033  2.21 
accommodation -0.162  -0.33  -0.564  -1.70  -0.042  -2.63 
communications 0.513  1.08  -0.935  -2.92  -0.037  -2.37 
property -0.351  -0.85  0.080  0.29  0.024  1.79 
sport and recreation 0.485  0.90  0.219  0.61  0.011  0.64 
personal services -0.702  -1.51  -0.308  -0.98  -0.018  -1.18 
mining 0.490  0.69  0.717  1.50  0.016  0.70 
constant 5.289  10.22  -1.513  -4.34  0.154  9.10  3.949  9.12  -3.494  -9.33  0.159  10.61 
No. of obs 1070  1070  1070  1283  1283  1283 
F( 33,  1036) 11.17 F( 33,  1036) 5.12 F( 33,  1036) 5.46  F( 28,  1254) 23.37  F( 28,  1254) 7.84  F( 28,  1254) 8.86 
Prob > F      0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
R-squared     0.26  0.14  0.15  0.34  0.15  0.17 
Adj R
2 0.24  0.11  0.12  0.33  0.13  0.15 
Root MSE      2.42  1.63  0.08  1.65  1.43  0.06 